

Adult Development Theory and the Politics of History

An integral approach to studying the transformation of political cultures with examples from post-Soviet Russia, Germany and elsewhere

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Introduction

The following reflections are based on my almost 15 years of personal and academic preoccupation with political and cultural developments in Russia, during which I took a special interest in Russia's way of relating to its Soviet past after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Born and socialized in Germany, my main focus of interest has always been the connection between Russia's ways of dealing with her non-democratic and totalitarian experiences of the 20th century and the country's general political development. Having gained increasing familiarity with integral, and, in particular, developmental approaches during the past years, it seems a fascinating and challenging endeavour to combine the two research trajectories, which the following contribution attempts to do.

20th century Europe has seen multiple social and political disruptions, jerks and traumas, the most shattering of which have certainly been National Socialism in Germany and Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Analyzing how these and similar collective traumatic experiences influence a nation's social, cultural and political development is therefore an important field of attention in the social and political sciences. Not only is the way in which a society relates to and eventually deals with its past (especially with the inconvenient parts of it) an expression of its memory culture. It also tells a lot about its self image, identity and overall outlook on the world around it and can thus be considered as an important indicator of political culture and development in a more general sense.

Besides being an interesting strategy to inquire more deeply into political culture, i.e. into the realm of collective consciousness (Lower Left Quadrant in Wilber's model), analyzing political uses of history can also provide interesting insights into the life and functioning of other areas of a given social and political entity. Since none of the quadrants stands alone, political culture is connected to and to some extent also an expression of the structures framing individual consciousness (Upper Left) and behaviour (Upper Right) in a given cultural realm, as well as shaping its political institutions in many ways (Lower Right).ⁱ

As to the case of Germany, it is a commonplace that the country's efforts to break with its national-socialist past have been at the basis of its successful re-integration into the western community of liberal democracies. However, in view of analyzing the Russian case, it is important to note that Germany as well has seen different phases of addressing its past. While post-war (West) Germany did undertake a clear institutional break by adopting a liberal and democratic constitution, the commitment to democratic ideals, at least for some parts of society, was at first still somewhat superficial, and the early Federal Republic produced a number of public scandals

for its reluctance to persecute war criminals and to expulse former nazi officials from their posts in public administration (Frei 1999). During the 1960s and 70s, similar issues were a central trigger of a more profound socio-cultural revolution, borne by a new generation starting to question the biographical past of both their own parents and of important political actors. I result, a growing proportion of the population steadily came to adopt a truly democratic political culture which also allowed democratic institutions to take deeper roots (Inglehart 1974, Inkeles 1972). Finally, during the past three decades, an increasingly differentiated culture of memory (and of memory research) has developed, based on a serious, more and more level-headed yet relaxed relation towards German history. On this basis, the country was recently able to invite the world to join it in a joyful celebration the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall.

Given the at least similarly traumatic experience of Stalinism for Russia, how do the experience, as well as the ways of relating to it influence Russian society, politics and culture today? In contrast to Germany, whose institutional break with Nazism was to a significant degree enforced by the country's military defeat and by the power of the allies, post-Soviet Russia has still not been able to find a social and political consensus about how to deal with its Soviet and in particular Stalinist past. After a first wave of democratization based on moderate anti-Stalinism in the late 1980s and a more pronounced anti-Soviet discourse in the early 1990s, the country resorted to more nostalgic, partly even Soviet-style patterns of constructing and commemorating its recent past since Vladimir Putin took office as president. The self-image of a heroic great power lead by a strong man has regained popularity and is even regarded as the major uniting element of political discourse today (Müller 2009) while the multiple "dark sides" of Soviet history such as state induced crimes, terror and repression until most recently tended to be suppressed and faded out of public consciousness (again). Putin himself has even justified Stalin's crimes as the necessary price of modernization.ⁱⁱ In this regard, I claim that, first, this state of public political consciousness has a fundamental influence on Russia's socio-cultural and political development today – and that it can even be regarded as a major explanatory factor of the latter (Fein 2007). Second, I argue that an integral, particularly a developmental analysis of politically motivated constructions and uses of history can therefore not only make a substantial contribution to the field of memory research but also provide important additional insights into Russia's post-Soviet development in a more general sense.

The following article takes a look on political uses of history as practiced above all in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, inspired by several adult developmental perspectives. In particular, it analyzes continuities and changes of historical identity construction through a framework of self development. This approach is based on three arguments: *first*, that the politics of history, i.e. the way in which a country's history is constructed by its political actors, is an important indicator of political culture (Lower Left); *second*, that constructing a social holon's history and memory means constructing its collective self or identity and is similar to identity construction and self-development on the individual level; and *third*, that political uses can therefore be studied through and explained by models of self-development describing growing capacities to include more perspectives, such as those of Kegan and Cook-Greuter.

The first section of this article introduces two ideal typical approaches from the field of memory research on the basis of which the second section inquires into the phenomenology of memory culture in Russia and the Soviet Union. Section three presents several models of self-development and discusses their relevance for explaining phenomena of social identity and political transformation. Finally, section four proposes a model to classify political uses of history on a scale of growing complexity, mainly drawing on Susanne Cook-Greuter's action logics.

1. Memory research and political uses of history – two ideal types

While a more exhaustive overview of the field of memory research would exceed the limits of this article, my aim here is merely to distinguish two main strands of research, a normative and an analytical one, which I treat as ideal types here, and which I consider to be both useful for analyzing empirical phenomena and relevant for the following developmental reflection.

When memory culture and research thereupon developed in Germany during the 1950s, this basically happened under the label of "*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*", best translated as "*dealing with*" or „*coming to terms with the past*“.ⁱⁱⁱ Given the collective trauma of national-socialism which included both the obvious crimes committed by the Nazis (and their followers) and the failure of the majority of the German population to resist ideological seduction, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, as well as the public and scientific discourse around it adopted a rather normative, moral outlook. In other words: it was considered to be a society's first and foremost duty to psychologically and politically confront what had happened in order to avoid its repetition in the future. This normative outlook consequently judges a society's ways of dealing with its past according the degree to which the criminal and traumatic aspects of it are critically re-appropriated both mentally and emotionally and thus eventually overcome both on individual and collective levels. To the extent that this process demands the willingness and effort of those concerned to "work through" (Adorno) experiences of trauma and guilt in an active way, *coming to terms with the past* can well be described as a transformative endeavour, again both on individual and collective levels. In case of success, it results in deep, vertical change as understood by developmental theory, i.e. in a reconstruction of one's identity/self image on a higher level of complexity.

As an example of this kind of early German memory research, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich's famous "Inability to mourn: principles of collective behaviour" first published in 1967 was among the most influential attempts to theorize both the impacts of national-socialist ideology on German politics and society and the difficulties to transcend it. Based on a vast amount of empirical evidence from their psychotherapeutic experience, A. and M. Mitscherlich show to what extent a large number of Germans were unable or unwilling to confront their own behaviour and thinking during the "Third Reich" even two decades after the end of national-socialism – and that to the same extent they remained trapped in a state of narcissistic mortification, defence and projection.^{iv} Even though the Mitscherlich's diagnosis of a widespread "inability to mourn" the traumas of the past was true at the time, this was the beginning of a rising wave of historical and judicial dealing with past crimes and an increasing public and political awareness by the second post-war

generation. It also fuelled scientific interest in the political impacts and conditions of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*.

Meanwhile – and probably in result of this, memory studies have taken a broader perspective. The growing interest in memory cultures and practices was bound to confront the fact that a large number of cases in- and outside Germany did and do not meet the normative moral standards of coming to terms with a traumatic past described above. This has brought forward the term “*politics of history*” which as a mainly descriptive and as such principally neutral, analytic term aims at detecting and analyzing how history is constructed and sometimes literally “staged” by social and political actors according to their respective political interests, motives and agendas in the present. On this basis, multiple comparative studies have been and are continuously being conducted concerning all kinds of political uses of history in many different countries, including Eastern Europe and Russia (for Russia see Fein 2000, Karl/Polianski 2009 and section 2 below). In fact, engaging in a process of coming to terms with the past in order to avoid its repetition can be regarded as one specific political use of history which, as section 4 will show, is typical of rather highly developed memory cultures.

The following section explores the phenomenology of memory culture in both of the senses introduced above as they can or could be observed in Russia and the Soviet Union.

2. Political uses of history in Russia and the Soviet Union – an empirical overview

In fact, we can find examples of both simple “*politics of history*” and of *dealing with* or *coming to terms with* (at least certain aspects of) the Soviet past, in particular with the legacies of Stalinism, in Russia as well as in the Soviet Union itself.

2.1 Coming to terms with the Stalinist past

As to the first, normative ideal type, we can distinguish three periods of Soviet and Russian history in the 20th century which have seen efforts to come to terms with Stalinism in the sense that an at least partial critical re-appropriation took place in view of preventing some of Stalinism’s most cruel excesses in the future.

The *thaw period* (named after Ilija Erenburg’s novel published in 1954) which began right after Stalin’s death in 1953 was characterized by a significant reduction of violence in politics, a return from Stalin’s personalized rule to the “collective leadership” of the members of the Politburo and a certain rule of law in social and political life. Some commentators therefore even spoke of a “democratization” of the regime. By returning to legalism as defined by Soviet law and constitution, Stalin’s heirs hoped to avoid a more radical questioning of the legitimacy of the communist party itself and thus, of its power and leading role in society. Instead, the thaw period was marked by a decisive settlement of accounts with Stalin’s so-called personality cult, heralded by Khrushchev’s *Secret Speech* at the Party’s 20th Congress in 1956. By blaming Stalin for a serious number of crimes – which thereby were admitted by the Soviet leadership for the first time – the Communist Party as a whole could be whitewashed from responsibility in order to renew its le-

gitimacy and strengthen its political power. What is more, during the 1950s and early 60s, millions of prisoners were released from Stalin's labour camps and a very small number of them (mostly high Party functionaries) even officially rehabilitated. At the same time, the public space saw a sensible liberalization and, in result, an overall, rather deep transformation which could be felt in all areas of social life. It is therefore no surprise that the generation socialized during the thaw period, the so-called people of the 60s (*shestidesjatiniki*), were among the main social actors supporting Gorbachev's perestroika 20 years later.

The second wave of coming to terms with Stalinism began shortly after Gorbachev's taking office as general secretary of the CPSU in March 1985, when he appealed for a fight against what he called "white spots" in Soviet history. During the following five years, not only were state and political institutions modernized and democratized (hence the name *perestroika*), but the liberalization of the discourse on history became a central theme of Gorbachev's presidency. His concessions to historical truth went a great deal further than those made by Krushchev, and Stalinism was now criticized bluntly in public, including broader and more far-reaching initiatives by the state to rehabilitate the victims of Stalinist repression. This new political line also encouraged a growing, more thorough and increasingly critical public discussion of more and more aspects of Soviet history, which since 1989 also included Leninism (still upheld by the political leadership as the basis of Soviet statehood). Moreover, the public debate soon "overtook" official statements in scope and radicalness. In result of historical memory seeing a steady pluralization and differentiation, controversies about how to evaluate Soviet history were among the main forces undermining the legitimacy of the Communist Party's monopoly of truth, and hence destabilizing its power. This finally led to the fall of the regime and to the end of the Soviet Union itself. So to an even stronger extent than before, the critical re-appropriation of Stalinism had an enormous transformative effect, both politically, institutionally and culturally (i.e. in all quadrants).

Given the importance of constructions of history for both the life (i.e. the legitimation of power) and the death (breakup) of the Soviet regime, it is not surprising that anti-Soviet and anti-communist discourse was an important element in the strategy of the first freely elected Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, to strengthen his own political power and legitimacy. However, even though Yeltsin was credited for standing up against the conservative communist bureaucracy, the fact that he seemed to make a shift from coming to terms with the past as an end in itself towards political, instrumental uses of history, was not well received. This was especially the case during the so-called CPSU trial at Russia's newly created Constitutional Court in 1992.^v Even though Yeltsin's team built their case to a large extent on authentic documents from the formerly secret state and party archives, which for the first time made public to what extent the CPSU violated not only international but also Soviet law, and even though the documentation of materials published in the course of the trial was a major contribution to our historical knowledge about the Soviet regime, the trial ended on an ambiguous note: The Court decided that the former ruling structures of the CPSU remained forbidden but that the local party organizations still had the right to operate (Fein 2007).

In result of this verdict, Yeltsin abandoned his former radical anti-communism and during the rest of his time in office tried to “reconciliate” the opposing social and political camps – without much success (see below). Nevertheless, while the official relation towards Soviet history from then on remained somewhat helpless and unoriented, unable to define a new historical identity, Yeltsin still supported an open public space encouraging multiple actors to commemorate whatever they deemed worth remembering, among them strong and powerful social initiatives to “work through” the country’s state-induced traumas. So even if the state was not among the most active actors, the Yeltsin era saw multiple and successful efforts to confront and come to terms with Soviet legacies.

It was under Yeltsin’s successor that official uses of history have reverted to rather closed and unidimensional forms, which to some extent de-legitimized and even implicitly fought some of the more open, more complex, more liberal and democratic perspectives that had gained power and legitimacy during the time of perestroika and afterwards. Let us therefore now look at the phenomenology of our second ideal type, the politics of history.

2.2 Political uses of history in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia

Political uses (which often are instrumentalizations) of history can be understood as ways of constructing collective identity through a particular historical self-image which, in most cases, is targeted on legitimizing the political regime currently in power. Since the way in which a social collective views itself in relation to others has immediate consequences for its political behaviour, both aspects are generally tightly connected. Here again, I can merely give a selective overview of the most important periods and types of making politically motivated uses of history, each of them using specific identity constructions for specific political endeavours.

Constructions of both history and collective identity were important elements of the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary program right from the beginning. In 1917 a radical change of the entire social, economic, political and institutional order was at stake, given the communists’ aim to completely “liquidate” the old system and to create a whole new society based on a “new human race”. Consequently, in their perspective, the representatives of the old regime had to be radically eliminated along with their history, their institutions, their culture and their symbols. While members of the royal family and the clergy, just as of the old military and intellectual elites, were either killed or expelled from the country (Werth 1997), the Bolsheviks also took care of erasing their images from public consciousness by deleting them from historical and educational materials. A telling example of early Stalinist use of history is the practice of retouching the portraits of persons who lost Stalin’s grace from historical paintings, books or encyclopedias. Anyone who kept such portraits in private despite prohibition to do so risked severe punishment (King 1997). Similar to the victims of merciless violent actions who were considered “unworthy junk”, Russian history was also rewritten to match ideological needs. More precisely, the Tsarist period was either completely ignored or became a mere pre-history of the Russian revolution. An example of this is the famous “Kratki Kurs/Short Course of the history of the CPSU”, the central history textbook written and varnished by Stalin himself, in which he politically instrumentalized history by polarizing a

complex reality into neat, well suiting patterns. As a rule, early Soviet politics of history seemed to be exclusively motivated by the Bolshevik's own aims and objectives through which they perceived what was true or false, worth or unworthy to be remembered. In result, a large number of groups of the population had to hide their social origins and their personal and family histories, and often enough had to take false identities in order to find jobs and to socially integrate in the new socialist environment (Forteeva 2004, Hellbeck 1996).

A central element of politicized historical identity construction in the Soviet Union was the construction of heroes and anti-heroes. Besides excluding large proportions of the population from the public space and constructing them as anti-heroes, dividing the political world into ideological black and white also involved the creation of new, positive heroes (Satjukow 2002). The most important of these were of course Lenin and Stalin themselves. By ascribing God-like qualities to them such as wisdom, vision, courage, fairness, strength and benignity while at the same time portraying them as good buddies or fathers of the nation (Stalin loved to pose together with young children) they became mighty objects of projection for the simple Soviet citizen. However, Soviet heroism also included the construction of multiple other, more popular kinds of heroes, among them heroes of socialist production and war heroes (Satorti 2002). Both categories were actively pushed by the regime as pillars of either constructing socialism or of defending it against imperialist threats (Satorti 2002, Bohn 2002, Rathe 2002).

After Stalin's death, his cult of personality had been deconstructed by Khrushchev as mentioned before. But not only did Lenin remain in his God-like position throughout Soviet history – and is still kept in the Mausoleum on Red Square until today – but ideological politization and manipulation of historical events also remained a stable practice of Soviet identity politics. Their basic aims were a positive self presentation of the ruling elite combined with stigmatizing opponents and critics. For the years following Stalin's death, official Soviet politics of history concentrated on discrediting Stalinism in a way that did not harm communist rule. Moreover, crimes committed under Stalin were a high stake and an important trump card in the power struggle between Khrushchev and his competitors within Soviet leadership. When Khrushchev allowed for more and more revelations, especially in order to show the involvement of some of his colleagues in Stalinist repressions, the latter finally put an end to destalinization by removing Khrushchev from office in 1964. He was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev who became famous for 20 years of political "stagnation" which also included a certain restoration of a pro-Stalin political climate.

With regard to identity politics, the late 1950s and 1960s also saw new issues appearing in the center of collective self-definition, in particular Soviet achievements in science, engineering and sports. The era of space travel and technology became an increasingly popular field of new heroism, the greatest hero being Jurij Gagarin, the first person in space (Gestwa 2009). With regard to both the politics of history (destalinization) and of identity (self-image), it is notable that in the thaw period, competition gained importance over destroying competitors and adversaries as a general strategy of political sense-making and problem solving.^{vi}

One of the constants of historical memory and identity construction since the 1960s and throughout the rest of Soviet history was the memory of the Second World War (Great Patriotic War). It was characterized by worshipping the heroism of Stalin, his military advisors and collaborators, as well as of the army and patriotically fighting people while fading out dark sides such as defeats of the Red Army, mass repressions against soldiers and civilians, life under occupation, the Vlasov army, deportations of entire nations and other issues. In some sense, the memory of the Great Patriotic War marks an important change in Soviet identity politics: While political legitimization under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev was primarily based on the prospect of a shining communist future, it now became increasingly based on a heroic past.

Concerning the era of perestroika, we have already mentioned how the unidimensional and polarized worldview as presented by the official politics of history until then steadily differentiated towards a more pluralist perception of Soviet history. In view of Russia's national heroes, this meant first of all a radical dethroning and deconstruction of most of the former heroes in the course of the "hunt" for black/white spots in history. While Gorbachev himself could therefore in some sense be called a new hero of liberalization and democratization for a while, this quickly changed when the extremely unpopular dissolution of the Soviet Union, which Gorbachev was made responsible for, became reality. For another short while, Yeltsin then displaced Gorbachev as a hero of the masses when he defended the capital against the communist Coup of August 1991, standing on a tank on Parliament Square. However, Yeltsin's popularity too decreased again soon in result of his weak leadership, his alcohol problems and his overall inability to offer new, appealing objects of identification. With a more radical anti-communism having been discredited in the CPSU trial, Yeltsin for the time being limited himself to ambivalent attempts to somehow reconcile the opposing political camps by an eclectic mixture of pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet symbols and elements of identification (Fein 2002, Smith 2002). His efforts to find a new national idea through a public competition were not successful though. Therefore, Russia for the roughly ten years following the end of the Soviet Union struggled in vain to find new heroes and a positive post-Soviet identity able to unite the nation. In fact, this lack was one of the most characteristic markers of the Yeltsin era – and one of the reasons why Putin's alternative strategy was more successful in gaining public support.

After Vladimir Putin had taken office as president in 2000, history became a more important domain of state politics again while at the same time public discourse about history saw a certain de-pluralization connected to Putin's centralist and restrictive media politics (Mommensen/Nußberger 2007). The presidential administration increasingly took responsibility for – or, put more directly, intervened into areas such as the choice and edition of history textbooks by including a more positive view of Stalin and Stalinism and by evaluating and even criminalizing certain views of history while officially sanctioning others, namely an overall "patriotic" culture of national greatness and pride. As a consequence, more critical initiatives to "work through" Soviet history were increasingly marginalized and sometimes even constrained while the style of the state's political interaction with society and critical NGOs to some degree remembered Soviet practices and examples (Mommensen/Nußberger 2007).

Central elements of the new “patriotic consensus” introduced under Putin were and continue to be national greatness, based on an image of historical and political continuity from Peter the Great through Stalin to Putin, multiple expressions of strength and power, especially towards Russia’s neighbouring states and at times accompanied by a rather harsh and massive discourse (Müller 2009). Another important element of identity politics under Putin was the (former) president himself. Even though the presidential administration never admitted an active involvement in the development of a personality cult around Putin, such a cult has been “actively tolerated” during the past years. It was basically constructed around properties like Putin’s physical strength, health, masculinity and sex appeal, combined with his statesmanship, military aptitude, shrewdness, gamesmanship and rigor vis-à-vis enemies of the state (Engelfried 2007).

So how can these and other examples of empirical politics of history and identity (in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia and elsewhere) be interpreted and analyzed from a developmental perspective? And how can this contribute to memory research in a qualitative sense?

3. An integral framework for analysing political constructions of history and identity

The following paragraph gives a short overview of those concepts and models of consciousness development which appear most suited for analyzing empirical politics of history and identity. It also asks how these concepts can be reasonably combined and integrated in view of a more differentiated, integral analysis of concrete phenomena which transcends and includes what is offered by the two main strands distinguished before (see section 1). In order to cover as many facets as possible of what political constructions of history and identity are usually about I suggest that an integral, Neo-Piagetian approach should at least include Selman’s development of perspective taking, Kohlberg’s account of moral development, Kegan’s ego- and Cook-Greuter’s self-development. Without being able to discuss these approaches and their interrelations in detail within the limits of this article, I argue that their combination provides a solid ground for and interesting new insights into the workings of history and identity construction. So let us first have a short look at the main focus of each of the models mentioned above, their relevance for studying social phenomena and for analyzing history and identity politics in particular.

3.0 Piaget: Cognition

Concerned “with both the formation and the meaning of knowledge” (Piaget, 1970: 12-13), Jean Piaget’s “genetic epistemology” of cognition distinguishes four major levels of cognitive development (sensorimotor, pre-operational, concrete-operational and formal-operational, each with several sub-levels), characterized by a successive decrease of egocentrism as development proceeds and, in turn, by a more developed capacity of abstraction and of integrating more perspectives into one’s outlook on the world on each new level. Originally stemming from Piaget’s observation of children’s cognitive development, his findings have proved to be valid and applicable to adults as well. Moreover, empirical evidence shows again and again that especially the fourth stage, classically identified with the cognition of the “mature adult human being”, is not reached by a significant number of average adults during their lifetime.

Since the general structure and quality of cognition is taken to “exist independently of the object of thought” (Rosenberg, 1988: 89), Piaget’s famous work thereupon has been the basis of many other developmental accounts, amongst others of those of moral thinking, self-identity, values and political reasoning. However, the research on *social cognition* has discovered significant differences between the perception of social and material objects, animate and inanimate ones, in other words, between social and physical causality (Silbereisen 1987: 702). Therefore it deserves particular attention here.

3.1 Selman: Perspective Taking and Social Cognition

According to Robert L. Selman, social cognition, “cannot be reduced to the simple application of cognitive abilities onto the social world”. It rather is the precondition of applying cognition to social relations (Selman 1984: 18, 27). Therefore, interpersonal perspective taking and perspective coordination as the central capabilities of social cognition have to be considered as a self-contained dimension of consciousness development. As such, Selman’s research is indeed strongly inspired by Piaget’s (and Kohlberg’s) structuralist theories in that it has come up with a sequence of hierarchically organized, invariant, irreversible and universal developmental stages each of which reorganizes the elements, concepts and scripts of the previous one as a qualitatively new strategy of social cognition and interaction on the basis of decreasing egocentrism and, in turn, increasing “social competence” (Selman 1984: 7, 32, 41; see table below).

Drawing on G.H. Mead’s model of role taking, Selman defines social perspective taking as a (growing) awareness and understanding of how various people’s perspectives are related and coordinated with one another, as well as an understanding of intrinsic psychological characteristics and capabilities of individuals. In other words, it includes both the relations *between* individuals and those *inside* individuals. As a combination of developmental and social psychology, the concept addresses thinking as well as acting, and thus contains an essentially social component (ibid.: 30f).

Since a higher level of perspective taking generally means higher awareness and sensitivity of social and interpersonal problems, and mostly results in higher cooperativeness and readiness to help others (Silbereisen 1987: 731), the development of social perspective taking as a basic social competence is not only a precondition of moral reasoning as analyzed by Lawrence Kohlberg (Selman 1984: 48; see below), but also a central tool for analyzing individual and collective perspectives on history, historical events and on past interaction between different groups.

3.2 Kohlberg: Moral Development

Kohlberg’s concept also perceives the self in relation to others. Inspired by Piaget’s “moral development of children”, Kohlberg has presented a broad account of the development of moral judgments and their justifications. As Piaget and Selman, he defines stages of moral reasoning as “new structures serving old functions and replacing or reintegrating the previous structure which used to fulfil those functions” (Kohlberg 2007: 328). And like Piaget, he found that the majority of American adults only achieve levels 3 or 4 during their lifetime (ibid.: 252). Moral stages are un-

derstood here as “lenses or filters through which (a) a moral situation and the emotions connected to it are perceived and through which (b) the alternative actions available to the subject can be formulated” (ibid.: 44).

As in the case of Piaget and Selman whose structural hierarchies of (social) cognition have been found to be a precondition of the respective moral structures^{vii}, attaining a higher level of moral reasoning means acquiring more adequate moral outlooks on things, i.e. being more moral. In this conception, the highest level would thus produce solutions which all involved parties can consent to and accept. Kohlberg’s model is therefore an equally essential tool in view of analyzing political uses and evaluations of history and historical identity construction.

The interdependence of (social) cognition, perspective taking and moral development clearly shows that neither of these lines of development stands alone. Moreover, Kohlberg himself, in his posthumous publication “The Psychology of the Life Span” has stressed the unity of cognitive, moral and psychosexual development (ibid.: 83). Kohlberg’s notion of the self as “constituted by thinking and feeling within a body” (ibid.: 85) leads us to the concepts of ego- and of self development as proposed by Robert Kegan and Susanne Cook-Greuter.

3.3 Kegan: Ego Development

While Piaget insisted that “there are not two processes of development, one cognitive and one affective; there are not two separate psychic functions, and not two forms of objects: all objects are cognitive and affective at the same time”^{viii}, Kegan remarks that Piaget did not fully measure up to this claim in his own work. In view of the cross-relations between cognition and other dimensions of development, Kegan himself has therefore put the focus of his research on the development of the ego or (epistemological) self as “that who speaks and/or acts,” in other words: on the “core identity from which a person constructs her/his meaning out of various experiences”. Claiming that “every step/every stage can be viewed as the result of a single, fundamental process of development” (Kegan 1991: 106), his theory “is about the general structure of the perceiving mind, focusing on how our evolving ‘epistemological self’ structures our experience” (Jordan 2000: 16). These general structures of reasoning, in turn, have implications for how a person conceives her/himself in various social contexts on various stages of development.

My project of applying Kegan’s model onto social phenomena, more precisely, on collective identity, is encouraged by his strong plea in favour of viewing personal psychological and socio-political development jointly. Similar to Selman, Kohlberg and others, Kegan calls separating them “a result of theories the basic concepts of which are too narrowly framed” (Kegan 1991: 134, 283). While some characteristics may differ between individual and collective (socio-political) development, the basic subject-object mechanism of differentiation (decentering) and integration (recentering on a higher level) as described by Kegan seems to be the same in both cases.^{ix} Furthermore, I would argue that the stage descriptions of the self proposed by Kegan (impulsive, imperial, interpersonal, institutional, and principal/inter-individual) are highly suitable for describing typical patterns used in discursive constructions of collective selves/identities as well. There-

fore, Kegan's model is of immediate relevance to our understanding of processes of historical identity construction in contexts of dislocation and transformation in the course of which structures of reasoning, self-images and historical meaning are often severely shattered. All of these phenomena are widespread elements of political discourse in post-Soviet Russia.

3.4 Cook-Greuter: Self Development

Finally, Susanne Cook-Greuter's action logics, an advancement of Jane Loevinger's model of self development, provides an even more differentiated account of the development of self systems and identity which is therefore of equally high value here. Cook-Greuter's central interest is in "how human beings respond to life" (Cook-Greuter 1990: 79). Similar to Kegan, she views self-development as composed of several strongly interrelated components (operative/behavioural, affective, and cognitive), with each new stage emerging "from a (new) synthesis of doing, being, and thinking" (Cook-Greuter 1990: 80, 85). And similar to Selman, Kegan, Kohlberg and others, she sees the human individual as an essentially social being dependent on a "human context," since both (self-related) meaning-making and meaning-maintenance are possible only within a socio-cultural community (Cook-Greuter 1990: 81).

As a matter of fact, all four theorists stress that social communities play a crucial role as "embedding cultures" for both development and failing development. For they provide – or do not provide opportunities of role-taking fostering or constraining capabilities of perspective taking, moral action and personal growth. My claim is that therefore, historical identity construction in general and political uses of history in particular are interesting indicators of the structural logics governing particular political cultures and the behaviour of the people therein, since relating to one's own nation's past includes all of the aspects covered by the theorists mentioned before. It namely involves:

- constructing the collective self and identity (who are we and whom are we different from?)
- including or excluding perspectives of particular (other) historical and/or present social actors
- constructing certain actions as moral or immoral
- making meaning of individual and collective experiences and drawing consequences from them.

In their concrete form all of these practices are made possibly by and are thus to some extent expressions of particular subject-object balances in the relevant developmental lines, in that they view certain phenomena as given realities while others are perceived as subject to change, more precisely to one's own private and/or political action and decisions. The next section attempts to analyze some of the phenomena of historical identity construction described in section 2 on the basis of a combination of the models of adult development outlined before.

4. Empirical politics of history viewed from a developmental perspective

In order to make qualified assessments of empirical phenomena of history and identity construction, we have to each time ask:

- How many of the perspectives of those people principally concerned by a problem are included in the actor's construction of the problem?
- How is a particular collective self/identity being constructed? Who does it in-/exclude?
- What do the respective subject-object-balances look like (what is regarded as given, what as subject to change/own action?)
- How wide is the horizon of moral reasoning?
- To what extent does transformation take place through self-reflexive introspection and including more perspectives?

Since Susanne Cook-Greuter's model is the most differentiated account of self-development currently available, I will structure the following overview alongside her stage definitions and descriptions^x and look for cross-relations to the other models from there. Due to space limitations, the whole chapter is working with ideal typical ratings. My interpretation of concrete phenomena and their scaling on different developmental lines should therefore be regarded as work in progress and as integrally informed suggestions open to discussion.

4.0 The Symbiotic Self – Identity of Self and History

Stage 0 in my table (named stage 1 by Susanne Cook-Greuter) is of no interest here since symbiotic individuals are identified with their bodies without a separate psychic consciousness (Selman 1984: 147f.). Translated to history construction, this would mean that there is no distinction between the individual, his/her feelings/experience and history/reality, hence no construction of history as separate from physical life. Actor and history are the same.

4.1 History is what I want – the Impulsive Self

The impulsive self is the first stage measured by Cook-Greuter's Sentence Completion Test (SCTi). It reflects the first person perspective, i.e. an attitude of subjectivity and largely governed by impulses. According to Cook-Greuter, the impulsive mind is characterized by its growing sense of self and of unlimited power and ownership. "Other people are seen as primarily a source of gratification or supply. Good people give to me, mean ones don't." Cognitive simplicity, i.e. the inability to adequately grasp the complexities of adult life and of the world go together with verbal undifferentiation (Cook-Greuter 2007: 9). Cook-Greuter's impulsive self probably corresponds best to Selman's "intentional subject".

Some of early Bolshevik, and in particular Stalinist politics (and politics of history) seem to be good examples of impulsive action logics. Celebrating itself without self-criticism, the impulsive self only sees what it wants to see and erases all which does not fit into its image of the world both from its symbolic and – often enough – also from the real landscape. Power is understood as being unlimited both in physical and symbolic senses and acted out accordingly. As a consequence, morality is reduced to a question of obedience and/or punishment (Kohlberg's stage 1).

4.2 The Self-Protective identity: constructing in- and out-groups (stage 2/3)

The next more complex level of development shows a beginning notion of others as independent entities having their own wants and will to get. Nevertheless, the self-protective structure is “as yet incapable of a more than rudimentary insight into itself or others in a psychological sense” and thus still sees the world only from the perspective of its own needs and wants.

This is why self-protective folks are generally wary of others’ intentions, perceive them as competitors, and assume the worst. Everything to them is a war of wills, and life a zero-sum game. Their ‘I win, you lose’ mentality inevitably causes friction and hurt feelings wherever they go, especially with people at more conventional stages. When they lose a test of will, or overstep a boundary, self-protective minds see the cause as outside themselves, getting frustrated and tending to show free-flowing anger and hostility. Others are to blame, never oneself. Because in their perspective, the only way to get what one wants is by controlling others and protecting oneself, others often experience them as manipulative and exploitative. While self, identity and self-respect are experienced in relation to the amount of control one can achieve over others, self-protective people do not understand subtle human interactions that are not based on power. Feelings are externalized and projected outward. We see little expression or reflection on their own emotions both because of a lack of insight and for self-protection. Showing weakness of any kind is dangerous. “The more others know about me, the more they can take advantage of me”, so they think.

For the self-protective structure, the world therefore is a hostile, dangerous place where cleverness and grabbing opportunities are necessary for survival. Consequently, the self-protective structure has an expedient morality. Rules are recognized, but only followed for immediate advantage or to avoid punishment. Like Kohlberg’s stage 2, it asks: “*What’s in it for me?*”. When caught, it is shameless and shows little remorse. It does not feel responsible for failure or trouble it causes. Self-protective people are also called opportunistic because of their self-serving attitude as well as for their nose for opportunities and their energy to go after what they want without reflection or delay (Cook-Greuter 2007: 9-11).

Hence, the self-protective action logic perceives constructions of history which are opposed to or different from its own as a threat to its identity and therefore seeks to prohibit and/or punish them. While it does have an anticipation of its own dark sides, it is reluctant to take responsibility for injustices committed in the past. Instead, it strives to convince itself and others of its own greatness with pomp and circumstances, and the same pomp is used to stamp on all that is undesired. Constructions of history based on a self-protective identity are typically motivated by fear of losing face and/or power and will therefore by all means avoid confrontation with past crimes.

A number of examples can be found in Russian politics, but also in cases like contemporary Turkey. Generally speaking, I would argue that (pre- and post-Stalinist) Soviet politics of history were permanently driven by a more or less self-protective action logic, seeking to stabilize the current regime’s power by presenting positive, heroic self-images and fading out dark aspects from public consciousness. However, this was done in different ways by different leaders. Of course, Khrush-

shchev's de-stalinization project was much different from Brezhnev's "soft re-Stalinization" in the era of stagnation. While the latter was a rather simple form of self-protection, the former could either be considered as a more "developed" type, or as containing elements of *self-conscious* action logics (Cook-Greuter's stage 3/4, see below). For even if Khrushchev's de-stalinization equally sought to protect the party's and his own leadership, it nevertheless demonstrated a remarkable skill with using particular history and identity constructions for settling accounts with political opponents and with making intelligent use of symbolic mechanisms in order to stage-manage Khrushchev's political goals.

A more recent example of a self-protective use of history is the symbolic "re-Sovietization" enforced by Vladimir Putin during his two presidential terms. Avoiding an open confrontation with the dark sides of Soviet history, Putin's eclecticist identity politics apparently served as a strategy to protect the collective self from losing face in a more thorough, more differentiated, more self-critical and thus more demanding process of re-appropriating the past. Instead, he offered a new geopolitical identity based on an image of national – and personal – strength, power and control, combined with dramatic gestures, alleged threats, conspiracy theories, concepts of the enemy, and even the use of illegitimate violence. Martin Müller in his recent study about great power discourses at Russia's elite university MGIMO finds that to be a "respected and influential, independent actor in world politics (with) a prospering economy, and a leading role in the post-Soviet states" is the main driving force of current politics and that it is indeed caused by fear of a potentially weak Russia losing its "national honor" and status (Müller 2009: 218).

In fact, Russia's foreign politics until recently continued to perceive and construct the world solely through the lens of Russian needs and wishes. Instead of taking more complex perspectives, accepting own weaknesses or showing empathy, they tended to make others (the US, NATO, the EU, newly independent former Soviet republics etc.) responsible for problems and conflicts while escaping debates about Russia's own shortcomings and mistakes (for example in the Georgian conflict or, with regard to the Baltic states). Obviously, giving up its self-defensive attitude would imply admitting past mistakes and trespasses, for example towards the countries of Russia's "near abroad", and eventually re-appropriating and emotionally integrating the collapse of the Soviet Union (and its imperial relation towards neighbouring states). According to Cook-Greuter however, the self-protective identity "is usually too weak to allow a similar behaviour, due to hurt feelings of security or to unconflicted angst and trauma" (Cook-Greuter 2007: 9-11). But in April 2010, an unexpected event seemed to have helped Russia to make the next step.

4.3 Conformist/Diplomatic politics of history: being the "nice girl/guy"

The following, next more complex subject-object-balance has a more elaborated perception of the other. Moreover, the basis of self and identity now comes to be defined by one's relationship to a group (whether family, tribe, team, nation or "the community of civilized nations"). Being part of this larger entity allows one to be protected and share in its power. The more status the group has, the more I feel worthy as one of its members. The price for this inclusion is loyalty and obedience which, in turn, can lead to over-identification and confused boundaries between oneself

and the group. In order to be liked it is important to be nice, pleasant, “good-looking” etc., i.e. to have a pleasing social personality and to meet expectations. Because Conformists so desperately want to belong, they deeply care about other’s opinions and evaluations. And they will conform to the rules and norms of whatever desired group, gang, political party they belong to. Owning a car just like one’s boss’s, for example, might really make a Conformist happy.

The conformist stage is that of the interpersonal self (Kegan), of reciprocity (Selman), interpersonal accord (Kohlberg), of mutual interdependence and good relationships. Politics now becomes a more cooperative field of giving and taking on the basis of mutual bonds and responsibilities. The notion of guilt becomes important in the sense that other political actors, mostly perceived as national we-groups, are conceded their own rights, views, emotional experiences and legitimate expectations. Therefore one’s (nation’s) actions and expressed emotions are adjusted to match those legitimate expectations.

An example of conformist identity and use of history is post-war Germany’s compliance with the conditions imposed on it by the allies, accepting its guilt and meeting the expectations of the victors. Another example seems to be Russia’s recent courtesy and cooperation with Poland after the plane crash of Smolensk. Poland which used to be regarded as Russia’s antipode on all levels is now treated as a nation with an equal right to its historical memory; and its emotions and historical sufferings are recognized with respect. Interestingly, Russia apparently enjoys this new role of the “nice guy”, meeting Poland’s and the world’s expectations by a “decent” and respectable behaviour towards mutual history – which, in turn helps it to become part of the “community of civilized nations” (again).

To what extent this new attitude was made possible precisely by Russia’s regained strength and sense of power remains subject to discussion. In any case, it marks a clear step forward on the scale of unfolding complexity of action logics and identity politics.

4.4 The Self-Conscious view of history: ideological truths about right and wrong (3/4)

Cook-Greuter’s stage 3/4 (*self-conscious*) characterizes people who are able to step back and look at themselves as objects from a distance. Individuals at this stage begin to be capable of some introspection, self-understanding and reflection upon the self. When one can take the third person perspective, permitting operations with abstract objects and concepts, a conceptual watershed is crossed. This also means differentiating oneself from the immediate family context and to assert and express one’s newly discovered personhood. This allows individuals at stage 3/4 to see alternatives and become aware of general “traits” and character patterns in others, which, in turn, also leads to an interest in sharing more of one’s inner nature. The conformist focus on likeness thus changes to focus on individual differences. People start to express their own personhood more often in contrast to others. They also assert more of their own needs and wants, which were suppressed at stage 3 for the sake of being accepted. This often includes wanting to be better than others and standing out from the crowd which is why stage 3/4 persons constantly compare how others measure up to conformist ideas and standards. At the same time, they often feel to have “figured it all out.” They know all the answers and what to believe. With their high

moral standards and strong sense of what should be^{xi}, often displaying compulsive and perfectionist tendencies or even a sense of superiority, they tend to put others in the wrong (resistance) or even ridicule them as a “sport”. Severe criticism of how another thinks is therefore a common form of intellectual aggression at this stage.

The self-conscious structure, corresponding to Kegan’s institutional self with its inner set of rules and identifications, intellectualizes, rationalizes and explains away what doesn’t fit its expectations or set beliefs by dismissing counter-evidence or belittling others. Therefore, this stage is described by Cook-Greuter as very resistant and stable. However, having just discovered their own separate personhood, Self-conscious people fear losing their sense of uniqueness again and getting drawn back into the mass. This fear of incompleteness and vulnerability is often counteracted by having a strong front.

Since the self-conscious structure differentiates between self and group, it begins to understand certain mechanisms, amongst others the functions of particular uses of history. Its critical attitude makes it question roles and dependencies and look for mistakes, especially for those of others while at the same time being very sure of itself and its own truths.

Examples of self-conscious uses of history are the generation of 1968’s criticizing their parent’s involvement with Nazism and their revolt against social norms and conventions. The same is probably true for the widespread ideological antifascism of the time and for the plain anticommunism, for example, of the Yeltsin era. As mentioned before, Khrushchev’s de-stalinization probably also contained elements of a self-conscious action logic in that it was concerned with uncovering Stalin’s mistakes and demonstrating its own moral superiority vis-à-vis both Stalin and internal competitors. Using Stalin as a universal scapegoat for shortcomings of both the regime and the enlarged leadership can be considered as a political version of the “sport” of ridiculing others. As to the period of Perestroika, it is somewhat delicate to assess, since it gave rise to a number of rather different action logics, among them also very highly developed ones such as the individualistic and autonomous approaches visible in the strategies of several civic organizations (see Fein 2000).

4.5 The Conscientious Self: taking responsibility for past actions (stage 4, Achiever)

The conscientious stage, typical for rationally competent and independent adults making reasoned and informed choices, is described by Cook-Greuter as the target stage of Western culture and as a precondition of Democracy as a form of government. The conscientious structure adds linear time (consciously thinking of one’s past and future selves) as concern to the third person perspective. Persons at this stage are interested in reasons, causes, goals and consequences and in the effective use of time. They believe in the perfectibility of humankind and in the ability of scientific methods to “uncover” truth, including truth about human nature. Formal operations and abstract rationality are at their peak use here. Conscientious adults are willing to work towards the betterment of the world according to what they deem as good for all.

Since they are less likely than self-conscious persons to believe that they do not need others to achieve their goals, they have more tolerance for some delay between positive action and results,

research and findings, questions and answers. Moreover, this stage expands the meaningful social context to others within the same society and others with similar ideologies and aspirations. Its adherents can therefore belong to diverse groups at the same time with different agendas and characteristics without feeling torn among them or getting confused by competing loyalties. Conscientious people act with the consequences of their actions in a particular social system in mind. They display a stronger interest in the truth about themselves through feedback and introspection. They learn to understand themselves backwards and forwards in time, and to describe themselves as complex psychological beings with their past feelings, personal dreams and future goals (although their emphasis is likely more future-oriented). They are no longer as proud of what they have come up with as self-conscious people and are more aware of how they have become and are still in the process of growing. Thus, the analysis of others and self-analysis become a favorite pastime and challenge. Due to its extended perspective on itself as object and on life as changing, the conscientious stage typically asks: “Do I live up to what I believe in?” And when aggression is turned inside, self-criticism can be severe. Also, due to internalized societal standards, guilt becomes a central emotion.

This is why stage 4 is the structure typically interested in “coming to terms with the past” in the sense of political obligation and a mature accounting for what has happened. Since the conscientious self can review past trespasses and their consequences for the future, it takes over full responsibility for them. And since it is able to integrate past injustices into its own thinking and acting, it gives rational explanations and mature justifications for doing so. While reason and rationality have gained importance over primary emotions, conscientious uses of history are also able to “stage” certain emotions in an adequate way, that is, as an expression of their responsibility and of their taking into account the perspectives and emotions of others.

The “prototype” of this action logic is German “*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*”, central elements of which were, for example, compensations for victims of Nazism and political reconciliation with countries like France, Poland, Russia and Israel. Conscientious politics of history also include the careful construction of new heroes, mostly heroes of resistance which remind society of its responsibility for its own actions in the past and their consequences in the future.

4.6 The Individualistic/Pluralistic Self: true empathy and compassion (stage 4/5)

At the first post-conventional level adults come to realize that the meaning of things depends on one’s relative position in regard to them, that is, on one’s personal perspective and interpretation of them as a (participant) observer. Although the objects themselves are seen as permanent, their meaning is seen as constructed. The same object/event can thus have different meanings for different observers, for the same observer in different contexts or at different times. The systems view (Common’s systematic operations) allows individuals to look at and compare systems of thought or organizations with distance. A main concern of post-conventional adults (stages 4/5 and 5) therefore is to lay bare underlying assumptions and frameworks. This regards both socio-culturally conditioned meaning making and their own attempts to make sense of themselves and their lives.

As a thought mode this constitutes an important change. Scientific certainty and judgmental frames of mind now break down. Everything is relative and truth can never be found, since there is no place to stand or judge from. This kind of mental freedom is typical of pluralist relativism and deconstructive postmodernism. But Individualists may also abandon purely rational analysis in favour of a more holistic, organismic approach in which feelings and context are taken into account and the process itself becomes as intriguing as the product or outcome. They replace the conscientious structure's focus on causality (past) and goals (future) by a fascination with the immediate present, trying to understand how things unfold. Their focus turns from outcomes and deliverables to an interest in processes, relationships and non-linear influences among variables. Individualists watch how they themselves and other people change and behave differently in different contexts. At the same time they do not want to impose their interpretations on others. They seek instead to respect and understand them. Their heightened capacity to contact the self and to introspect leads to a greater capacity to empathize with others and to tolerate different ideas, behaviours and reactions. Pluralists may even come to enjoy paradoxes and contradictions and no longer try to explain them away. Generally, individual differences are celebrated, and paid attention to in a way that Achievers cannot understand.

The individualistic self identity's mental habit to make room for everybody to express their voices and opinions has, as a social and intellectual force, encouraged the cultural and interpretative turns in the social and cultural sciences. Moreover, the growing interest in memory research – also in societies other than the German which had originally been forced to confront its past by external conventions – can be regarded as a typical post-modern phenomenon. And the increasing output of this rapidly growing research field certainly is an expression of the self-reflexivity of individualistic, post-modern societies eager to understand and reflect upon the foundations of their own social and cultural life – and upon burdens from the past potentially handicapping it – in view of constructing a better, more authentic future.

A privileged subject of this kind of memory research is a strong and authentic interest for individual biographies as they are collected, for example, in oral history interviews with eye witnesses of certain historical events. As a social practice, memory culture at this stage shows empathy and compassion for previously neglected perspectives, especially those of victims, but also those of perpetrators, in an attempt to really understand what happened and why, and to ultimately come to terms with (collective) traumatic experiences. In a context where the emotions of others, particularly of victims obtain more space than ever before, real reconciliation and encounter become possible. Moreover, post-modern, individualistic politics of history are one and the same as coming to terms with the past in the deep, psychological sense of vertical transformation of both individuals and collectivities.

Examples of emphatic uses of history, where memory projects, history workshops and encounter groups are a normal phenomenon, can meanwhile be found in all western and many non-western societies. Among the most outstanding examples of this action logic are the activities of *Memorial* in Russia and South Africa's commission of truth and reconciliation.

4.7 The Autonomous Self (Strategist, stage 5): integrating shadows and implementing growth of self and system

The autonomous self as the next more complex structure represents an enlarged fourth person perspective which places the individual's experience into the context of particular worldviews and within the totality of a person's lifetime. With the expanded time frame and wider social networks, the autonomous structure can perceive systemic patterns or long-term trends and is often valued for that "strategic" capacity. Cognitively it has a general systems view of reality, that is, it can comprehend multiple interconnected systems of relationships and processes. And again, this is true with regard to both outer and inner phenomena which are combined here within an overall perspective.

Persons at this stage are capable of "owning" and integrating many disparate, previously compartmentalized parts and sub-identities of themselves. The shadow side of the self can be acknowledged to a greater degree and therefore a new integration and wholeness is possible. Although they experience role conflicts, dilemmas and ambivalent feelings strongly, they recognize that these are inevitable and natural. With their access to a logical system able to integrate psycho-logically paradoxical elements, less energy needs to be spent on "defending". Strategists can thus be more tolerant and spontaneous than adults at conventional stages, even though unlike those at even later stages, they try very hard to keep their act together and to come across as reasonable and mature. As much as Autonomous persons need privacy and time for self-reflection, they also need others as vital to their well-being, knowing that only through dynamic and intimate mutual exchange can deeper self-knowledge and wisdom be gained.

One of the crucial new capacities here is to realize one's power to generate meaning and to tell a new story. From the understanding that meaning is an interpretation we bring to experience arises a personal commitment and responsibility to actively create a meaningful life for oneself and for others through self-determination and self-actualization within constantly shifting contexts. This includes a highly developed morality based on self-evaluated, internalized standards and principles (Kohlberg's stages 5 or 6) where behaviour becomes an expression of one's moral principles. Autonomous persons may therefore feel genuine anger and righteous indignation towards the injustices of the world. They will stand up against society to express their personal convictions or to uphold their principles. Hence, the greatest fear of this self system is to feel that they have not fulfilled their potential to "become the most they can be", or to have failed to observe those universal principles they value deeply (justice, tolerance, dignity of all people).

At this stage, dealing with past individual or collective experiences reaches an even more principal dimension. Different uses of history are recognized as expressions of individual and systemic factors, patterns and developments. Therefore, one's own engagements in this field necessarily take into account the wider inner and outer contexts. Encounters gain and correlations are examined in even more depth. As aims in themselves autonomous uses of history also become more important than external declarations or actions – even though they can also take the form of dramatic symbolic gestures. Coming to terms with the past is considered and consciously conducted

as a form of individual and collective shadow work, being part of one's own personal and/or one's nation's political growth process.

Since this action logic requires a very high level of self development, examples are less frequent and sometimes difficult to spot. (This is also why the two highest levels of self development as identified by Cook-Greuter are left out in this overview.) However, I would argue that Willy Brandt's kneeling down at the monument to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising on December 7, 1970, and Barack Obama's speech to the Muslim world at the University of Cairo on June 4, 2009, were instances driven by this action logic.

Conclusion

The previous chapters have shown that political uses of history and constructions of historical identity can profitably be analyzed and understood in terms of growing complexity of consciousness development, following the models of Piaget, Commons & Richards, Selman, Kohlberg, Kegan, Cook-Greuter and others. Even though there certainly *are* differences between individual and collective self images and identities, both can be defined by criteria such as the number of perspectives they include, the way they construct in- and out-groups, the type of moral reasoning they use and the degree of self-reflexivity they contain. Thus, given outlooks on history/identity can be interpreted as expressions of analogous levels of complexity within cultures and collectivities.

A developmental analytical outlook on memory cultures and political uses of history therefore provides substantial qualitative gains for memory research in that it adds the dimension of vertical complexity. By focusing on the development of the dominant structures of consciousness it transcends conventional approaches to the field (such as study of how and to what extent particular constructions of history are used for political aims/interests/motivations, and the question to what extent efforts are made to come to terms with a difficult past in a transformative way) while at the same time including them. Furthermore, a structural analysis of memory discourse and practices allows for more thorough evaluations of (potential) developments within societies and is thus a suitable instrument to inquire into the transformation of political cultures in a more general sense. Finally, exploring the dominant action logics of empirical social groups or entities also makes possible more focused, better-directed and thus more effective forms of political dialogue/communication and interaction/cooperation with partners like Russia on an international level. Eventually, this might even help to support further development in a given setting. In this sense, a wise use of integral, structural approaches to historical memory and identity can potentially have quite beneficial practical and political implications – a more detailed concretion of which, however, would exceed the limits of this article.

Overview of the stage models used in this article*

| Developmental Model → | | Jean Piaget (cognition) <i>Commons/Richards (General Stage Model)</i> | Robert Selman (social cognition, perspective taking) | Lawrence Kohlberg (moral reasoning) | Robert Kegan (ego development) | Susanne Cook-Greuter (self development) | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Stages identified | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Unitary | <i>Paradigmatic actions</i> | Symbolic interaction | Universal ethical principles | Inter-individual | Integrative/Unitary/Ironist | |
| 8 | Post-conventional | Post-formal? <i>Meta-Systematic actions</i> | | | | Social contract | Construct-aware/Alchemist |
| 7 | | <i>Systematic actions</i> | | | | | Autonomous/Strategist |
| 6 | | | | | | | Individualistic/Pluralist |
| 5 | Conventional | Consolidated formal operations <i>formal operations</i> | Social and conventional system | Authority and social-order maintaining; <i>law & (moral) order</i> | Institutional self | Conscientious/Achiever | |
| 4 | | Early formal operations <i>Abstract formal operations</i> | | | | Self-conscious/Expert | |
| 3 | | Concrete operations <i>Primary actions</i> | | | | Reciprocity | Expectations, interpersonal accord & conformity; <i>good boy/girl</i> |
| 2 | Pre-conventional | Pre-operational <i>Sentential + nominal actions</i> | Self-reflexive, introspective | Exchange, self-interest; <i>What's in it for me?</i> | Imperial self | Self-Protective | |
| 1 | | | Intentional subjectivity | Obedience & punishment | Impulsive self | Impulsive | |
| 0 | Pre-social | <i>Sensory-motor actions</i> | Individual as physical entity | | | Symbiotic | |

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* Note: The delineations of the stages of each model should be viewed independently of those of the other models. This overview does not claim to present exact correlations between the models presented!

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ⁱ For a more detailed analysis of correlations of memory culture with phenomena from other quadrants see Fein 2007.

ⁱⁱ See for example: "Fakten statt Mythen über den Stalinismus. Eine wissenschaftliche Konferenz in Moskau gegen die Verklärung und Verharmlosung des Diktators", NZZ 15.12.2008, http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/international/fakten_statt_mythen_ueber_den_stalinismus_1.1431992.html.

ⁱⁱⁱ The term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* is generally traced back to the historian Hermann Heimpel (Peter Dudek: *Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Zur Problematik eines umstrittenen Begriffs*. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage 1–2, 1992, Seite 44 ff.) and has been used by German President Theodor Heuss in many of his speeches. An early use of the term can be found in the invitation to a conference about the 20th Juli organized by the Evangelische Akademie Berlin in 1955 whose director Erich Müller-Gangloff spoke about „the shadow of an undigested (unbewältigt) past“ falling onto German history. See: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vergangenheitsbew%C3%A4ltigung#cite_ref-1 (13.4.2010).

^{iv} This is explained by the Mitscherlichs in a Freudian way, seeing unconscious feelings of guilt at the heart of neurotic suffering. On this basis, their study makes clear that emotionally confronting one's own projections (...) is an indispensable step on the way to inner transformation, i.e. to a psychological and emotional re-appropriation of past traumas. This especially concerns perpetrators, but in principle their victims as well. In view of inner transformation and growth, past mental and emotional habits have to be actively "worked through" in order to be transcended and replaced by more encompassing and thus more adequate ones.

^v The trial was about whether or not the CPSU, which had been banned from political life after its participation in the August Coup of 1991, should remain illegal, and whether or not it had violated the constitution.

^{vi} See: Kooperation trotz Konfrontation. Wissenschaft und Technik im Kalten Krieg, Osteuropa Nr. 10/2009.

^{vii} See the table in: Kohlberg 2007: 61.

^{viii} Quoted in Kegan 1982/1991: 120.

^{ix} In this process, the subjective identities of one level become objects of reflection of the next higher (more complex) level. Kegan therefore calls these levels subject-object balances or orders of consciousness. A fine summary of Kegan's stage model is given by Jordan (2000). For a discussion of subject-object-mechanisms in the realm of discursive change and transformation see Fein 2010.

^x All of the general stage descriptions below are Feinized citations from Cook-Greuter 2007. The passages on the respective uses of history at each stage are my own.

^{xi} Selman and Kohlberg therefore stress the importance of social order and conventions at this stage.